L100 Case Study: The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team
You are a promotable Lieutenant Colonel (LTC (P), having arrived at Fort Riley a month ago, following your graduation from the Army War College. You are scheduled to assume command of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The current brigade commander, Colonel (COL) Mike Johns, is retiring early for medical reasons. Your change of command is in thirty days. COL Johns was very gracious in facilitating your access to many aspects of the brigade to help prepare you for assuming command. In the last thirty days, you had an opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of documents to complete your initial assessment of the state of the brigade.
The 1st ABCT recently returned from a nine-month rotation to the Republic of Korea and is in the modernization window of its lifecycle within the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM).[1] The brigade redeployed and has been back at home station for almost two months with reintegration training and block leave complete. The most significant event in the next 12 months is the brigade’s rotation to the National Training Center (NTC). In addition to the home station training and resources requirements to prepare the ABCT for the Combat Training Center (CTC), the brigade will also support multiple levels of “experimentation” (new technology, force structure, and doctrine) during the rotation linked to the Army’s Transformation Initiative (ATI) and Army Warfighting Concept. This rotation is in preparation for a pending mission to Poland to support NATO interoperability training and operations as part of Atlantic Resolve. As such, the operational environment (OE) in which the brigade will operate during the rotation aligns with conditions outlined in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034. The mission support of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) requires two battalion-sized task forces to deploy for nine months. Simultaneously, the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission requires the remainder of the 1st ABCT to support several theater security cooperation engagements on the European continent, ranging in size from two-person teams to a company plus. While U.S. Army Europe (European Command) may cancel some of the existing engagements, they expect the number of engagements to increase, many with limited preparation time.
During the recent deployment the 1st ABCT was attached to the 2ID (Combined) Division Headquarters permanently stationed in Korea. The 1st ABCT worked with several other brigade headquarters (BDE HQs) that were permanently stationed in Korea as part of Eighth Army, yet the 1st ABCT leadership treated the Korean deployment like a “combat deployment” by enforcing a curfew, denying passes and weekends off, continuously running 24-hour operations, and directing and enforcing the alcohol prohibition per “General Order 1A”. This perceived misalignment with what permanent party units could do versus the 1stABCT in a Temporary Change of Station (TCS) status added to the collective aggravation of the unit. Furthermore, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 1st ABCT detached one of its combined arms battalions for a nine-month deployment to Jordan. This battalion, “The Ironsides” gained a reputation for being star performers and are very proud of the other division patch they wear on their right shoulder. The “Ironsides” off-handedly refer to their Jordanian deployment as the “real” deployment compared to the Korean deployment that the rest of the brigade experienced. The remaining two divisional BCTs on post deployed to Europe and are due to return in six months.
Many of the current 1st ABCT staff officers transition (Permanent Change of Stations/End Time in Service) in the next few months and the changes of command for three of the four battalions occur in the next sixty days. Your initial meetings with COL Johns, and CSM Matt Strand, the brigade command sergeant major, gave you a very positive perception of the ABCT. From your conversations with several individuals over the last thirty days, you learned that years ago 1st ABCT had a great reputation. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high and it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The brigade had focus. Leaders and Soldiers were dedicated to the mission and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, of course, but there was a prevailing attitude that most problems could be resolved. Regularly, leaders solved problems at lower levels, and they rarely reached the brigade command level. There was competition within the brigade, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Frequently the brigade and battalion officers met informally for social events and although these were social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade non-commissioned officers. Now it appears the environment is different. The battalions are competing, not to improve the brigade, but to set themselves apart from their sister units. Camaraderie amongst the battalion commanders, command sergeants major, and subordinate staffs appears superficial.
Over the last month, you had the opportunity to review several historical documents, observe routine meetings, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade area. Your review of the brigade’s historical unit status report (USR) indicates the 1st ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departing for Korea. The ABCT deployed at sixty-eight percent strength, although the assigned strength was seventy-five percent. The commander’s comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well trained and qualified. Most of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that surfaced within sixty to ninety days prior to the deployment date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-training-related medical problems. While the installation’s medical providers addressed many of the non-deployable Soldiers’ medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remained on unit rolls. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable Soldiers has slightly increased above pre-deployment numbers. The high number of “issues” and early redeployments created an increased interest across the 2nd Infantry Division Headquarters and staff and the home station division headquarters in questioning the accuracy of the ABCT’s pre-deployment USR report.
Approximately three months into the brigade’s nine-month deployment, an incident occurred that started a series of events that impacted the effectiveness of the brigade. The previous brigade Command Sergeant Major, CSM Lowe, was involved in a vehicle accident with a Korean family. The accident did not result in any deaths but did severely injure several Korean nationals. CSM Lowe was found to be at fault by the Korean National Police (KNP) due to Driving Under the Influence (DUI), but the ensuing investigation uncovered more than just the DUI. The authorities discovered that the brigade CSM had a female service member in the Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) with him who was also injured in the accident. The female service member was a sergeant in the brigade S1 shop and whose husband was a sergeant in one of the battalions in the field at Rodrigo Range. The Korean authorities released the findings of the police report to U.S. authorities. COL Frank, the previous ABCT commander, tried to downplay the events, preventing them from being publicized, and orchestrated a cover up to keep his CSM out of trouble and the whole incident quiet. Eventually the cover up emerged exposing COL Frank and CSM Lowe’s misconduct and the division commander relieved them. Upon COL Frank’s relief, the brigade executive officer, LTC (P) Wilson Broyles, assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Johns. CSM Strand arrived from CONUS a week later to take the vacant position from CSM Lowe.
You viewed the results of a climate survey that revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making. Those commanders did not meet the expectations of their junior officers on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. There is a perception by many officers of a lack of concern for leader development by the brigade leadership. The report indicated battalion commanders do not routinely counsel company commanders on their performance and the captains receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater. One company commander commented, “I have always been a top performer, I just do my best and hope it is good enough. If no one is yelling at me, I’m golden.” In addition to leader development challenges, the brigade is also working to overcome multiple equipment readiness challenges. Many of these are a result of recurring shortages of Class IX due to a mix up of funding codes for the deployment versus home station (Split property books and different funding authorizations).
The climate survey also revealed some Soldiers within the brigade HQs seem to like being a member of the ABCT, but report stress because of the unknown requirements of the upcoming RAF mission and the effect they anticipate it will have on their families. There is clearly some disappointment amongst the leaders in the ABCT. One entry read, “COL Johns tells us in formations to take care of our families, but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My husband is really fed up with this unit.” Another comment reads, “Major Lassiter (brigade S4) is always talking to the female Soldiers. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. He even goes out of his way to get certain females into his office. I think it is affecting the performance of the section, but what can I do, I am only a specialist.” Another comment read, “I am tired of getting chewed out about the smallest of issues. The leadership around here is on edge all the time. We never get anything done. We reinvent the wheel monthly for no purpose. Can’t wait to leave this organization.” Another added, “There is no direction here. We move from task to task without a purpose. Every day seems an adventure.” There were also several specific comments about a lack of time to complete assigned tasks and the frustration that despite working long hours nothing seemed to change. The desire to be an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of behaviors that were generally good-natured and helped instill an esprit de corps within the unit. However, the survey contains information that implies some non-commissioned and junior officers allowed these esprit de corps building events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. A couple of junior non-commissioned officer stated, “these events have progressed from esprit building to “sanctioned hazing.” You can find no indication that the ABCT leadership took any action on the issues within the survey.
Another document you reviewed is a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Quick Fire Lessons Learned report compiled from observations of CONUS based rotational units supporting operations in Korea. This document identified several key observations that may have an influence on the organization’s future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.
Personal Authorizations: Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to sustain 24-hour operations over the nine-month deployment. Often battle captains were taken “out of hide” to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion command post operations functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs. While the battalion staffs were undermanned, the brigade staff was adequately manned.
Command and Control: Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion level and below, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of the brigade being stationed at multiple camps (split-based operations) created significant digital network challenges for the brigade’s network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed, making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancies, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade created operational and personal friction.
Organization for combat: The modular BCT structure created training challenges, especially within the combined arms battalions. B battalion commanders took advantage of the “deployed environment” to conduct multiple alert procedures, deployments to local training areas, and several live fire exercises. The persistent strain on the battalion staffs to plan, resource, coordinate across their installations and with the brigade staff weighed heavily on them. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and a lack of critical modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorizations especially affected the BEB ability to support both brigade and battalion operations. The dispersed nature of the battalions required the BSB and their forward support companies to spend increased time on the roads supporting outlying locations.
The last historical document you reviewed was the brigade’s REARMM plan and timeline. A careful study of the document reveals the brigade returned fifty-five days ago. The brigade has another six months in the Modernize Phase before transitioning to the Train Phase. Of immediate concern is the pending arrival of the unit’s containers and equipment from Korea. The ship arrived at the port ten days ago and immediately began downloading equipment to rail back to home station. COL Johns expects the equipment to start arriving this week and be complete over the next two weeks. Of critical importance is the turn-in of ancillary equipment (NBC, NVGs, and radios) to the special repair teams beginning in ten days. The special repair teams will keep the brigade’s equipment for the next four to six weeks to complete technical inspections and repairs.
Earlier in the week, you had an opportunity to discuss the synchronization conference with COL Johns. The conference included representatives from Forces Command (FORSCOM), Department of the Army G1, G3/5/7, G4, G8, Army Material Command (AMC), and the division staff primaries. You learned that the program executive office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems Representative reported that you will not receive your new issue for at least another fourteen days. Further, Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical (PEO-C3 Network C3N) Representative, mentioned the brigade will receive all new Command Post equipment, but he did not think the equipment would be ready to issue for thirty days. The C3N representative also provided less than optimistic information regarding the brigade’s satellite communication packages. Since the brigade chose to forego much-needed system upgrades prior to deployment, most components on the existing satellite terminals are out-of-date and no longer under warranty. Additionally, the Army is fielding new communication trailer systems over the next three quarters of the fiscal year, with the brigade’s equipment not scheduled for delivery until just before entering the transition phase in 125 days. The information provided at the conference was grim. You also learned that the Program Executive Office (PEO)-Aviation informed the division leadership that the scheduled Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS/sUAS) New Equipment Fielding and Training (NEF/NET) timeline for the division has been accelerated and the brigade (select battalions/squadrons) may have to complete this training in conjunction with preparation for NTC. The division chief of staff, who attended the final out brief, pledged to COL Johns that he would remain on top of the division G3, G4, and G8 to ensure program managers and AMC upheld their end of the agreement and returned equipment to the brigade as soon as possible.
The personnel outlook is mixed. The brigade is losing people as they move to new assignments or leave the Army. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for three of the brigade’s battalions will occur in the next sixty days. The last personnel report indicated that the brigade had sixty to sixty-five percent of the staff sergeants required. This shortage was based on routine PCSs and transfers of NCOs to organizations deploying prior to 1st ABCT with higher manning priorities. The report also indicted the brigade missed its reenlistment objective the last quarter.
On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing the Command and General Staff Officer Course or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions’ strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. There is a significant turnover expected for the officers in the brigade headquarters and among company commanders. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment and expects Human Resource Command to fill the brigade at eighty percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade before assumption of the RAF mission.
Major (MAJ) Kehana Lewis is the brigade S1. He is a generally recognized self-starter and well respected in the brigade. Yesterday he was discussing an inbound personnel printout with you, and he brought one specific officer to your attention. One of the inbound lieutenants is a recent graduate of Ranger School and he wanted to know where to put her. He then commented, “We don’t want to screw this one up and hear about it on Twitter.” After mentioning to you he was having trouble finding the equal opportunity (EO) NCO to address a question from the division EO office, MAJ Lewis also gave you a heads up about a rash of REFRAD requests. He said he just dropped off seven packets in COL Johns’s inbox of officers requesting release from active duty. He also mentioned, based on discussions with the battalion adjutants at the last adjutant’s call, there would be more requests coming from the battalions.
The brigade S2 is MAJ Dan Walters. MAJ Walters appears to be very confident and competent, but he seems extremely anxious about his recommendations since returning from Korea. He has some good systems in place, as well as a good team. He works very hard to be on top of everything. LTC (P) Broyles commented to you during one of your previous conversations “Walters is overcompensating. He feels responsible for the investigation and denied redeployment of CPT O’Neal, the Alpha Company (MICO) Commander in the BEB. CPT O’Neal was implicated in allegations of misconduct and risk of OPSEC violations with local nationals and/or foreign agents while in Korea.”
MAJ Blake Lassiter is the brigade S4. The S4 section performed adequately while in Korea but is struggling with garrison operations. Blake appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, but he clearly does not know how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The S4 section has a conflict with the division G4 that has led to an adversarial relationship. The Soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group. MAJ Lassiter is under suspicion for improper use of the brigade’s government purchase card (GPC) during the deployment and the Eighth Army Chief of Staff has asked, through FORSCOM, to pursue an investigation. The Division appointed an investigating officer (IO) just last week.
MAJ Bobbie Yost, the brigade’s S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting you heard her discussing something with the deputy. She commented, “Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I am not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We’re not allowed to make routine decisions at our level, and it seems we jump from one crisis to another with no apparent direction. I thought when we returned from Korea the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to get reacquainted with my family. It was far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise. A division CPX for crying out loud! We just returned from deployment! We were told the division’s new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division’s 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Korea. At least there everyone knows they’re working 24/7 and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don’t have the family wondering why mommy isn’t home. Even my husband, who basically ran the brigade’s family readiness group when we were deployed, is about to throw in the towel.”
The 1st ABCT Chaplain is CH (MAJ) Henry “Hank” Baron. You remember him from a previous assignment where he served as a battalion chaplain in another division a few years ago. He came in this morning and mentioned he was on the brigade commander’s calendar and was bumped, again because “something important came up.” “I had real trouble getting in to see the commander since we returned.” His frustration and concerns were apparent as he went on to say, “You think we have problems; you don’t know the half of it, the things I am hearing and seeing should be his priority.” He continued voicing his concerns. “Without getting into too much detail I am actively counseling eight separate couples regarding infidelity or other marriage related issues. Many of these seem to involve issues from the last deployment. I have also discussed and referred numerous individual to Behavior Health to address other non-marital issues. I never thought I would be this busy once we got home. It never seems to end. But there are also good things happening and working well in certain companies that the commander needs to be aware of.” He seemed to be venting as he continued “Another thing you might have seen is the offices around here. Have you noticed how frequently the doors to the command group seem to be closed? Not sure what they are always talking about, but it seems like I should be involved. This is a big change from before we deployed. It’s just unsettling at times.”
Last week you witnessed an exchange at a brigade command and staff meeting. The commander and sergeant major of one of the battalions provided COL Johns and CSM Strand a detailed review on the impact “red cycle”[2] taskings had on unit operations, to include individual training, personnel management, and equipment modernization. The battalion commander stated, “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to reconnect with their families after being away for nine months, then pile on so many competing requirements, they must work until 19:00 hours each night. When you add on red-cycle tasks, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When my choice is to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it’s more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment from war, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive and taskings.”
The battalion command sergeant major added, “This is worse than I’ve ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division command sergeant major at his last senior non-commissioned officer call, he dismissed me by saying, “we had red cycles throughout my twenty-six years in the Army. They’ll always be here, so quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Korea!”
COL Johns responded, “Look I am not here to do your job for you! Figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or the sergeant major to fix your problems or whine to division about what you can or can’t do! Just get it done!”
Your interactions with the officers in the brigade S3 section were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and motivated by MAJ Karen Clark. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the S3. Clark supposedly focuses on the hot issues of the day, not long-range planning. They also mentioned Clark’s unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Clark indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of whom was new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Broyles, the brigade executive officer responded, “That’s just Clark flexing her muscle. Her system works and there’s no better brigade S3 in the division and everyone knows it. Those battalion S3s need to quit sniveling and get to work.”
In a private conversation last week, CSM Strand mentioned to you, “I’m worried about the senior non-commissioned officers. They appear competent but I don’t see any results from their work. They are sick and tired of the constant barrage of taskers, and they don’t believe anything they do is making a difference. There is no priority. Yesterday it was that, today it is this. Tomorrow it will be something else. There appears to be little teamwork among them and their officers. When I ask them why they don’t speak up and get involved, they ask, ‘Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.’”
As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on potential incidents of sexual harassment within the brigade. The conversation centers around one of the “superstar” company commanders, Captain (CPT) Brian Calendar. As one of the Distribution Platoon Leaders in the BSB, he travelled extensively around Korea. The consensus from the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel with whom you spoke is CPT Calendar gets results and is popular with battalion and brigade leaders. However, at least four individuals stated, “CPT Calendar really got around while he was on the road.” Another stated, “CPT Calendar had a girlfriend at every camp.” When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Broyles, the brigade executive officer, dismisses the issue by stating “CPT Calendar is very friendly, a real extrovert. Besides, the only person that mentioned anything approaching a complaint was a sub-par Soldier, so COL Johns dismissed the allegation.”
You also found out that the ABCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas, domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. While the ABCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases, there is no plan for prevention. The organization seems to be in react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. He mentions to you that the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the Korean deployment and an OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. The chaplain believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade, with some cases among members of the brigade staff still ongoing, and allegations of infidelity by the Rear Detachment Commander, hence the mid-deployment removal and the “basically running the FRG” by the Brigade S6’s husband. COL Johns’s response to the chaplain’s concern about these allegations was simply, “Those are only rumors. Don’t bring me that stuff without proof!”
Your informal conversations with friends in the division suggest the 1st ABCT gained a reputation in Korea for being very “heavy-handed” in dealing with locals and accusations on the verge of abusing the Korean Augmentees to the United States Army (KATUSA). While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place and transition of authority, their behavior took a marked downturn after the relief of the brigade command team. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade’s ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, “Broyles’s negative attitude of the Koreans created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it’s still there. COL Johns only made things worse with his hyperbole and condescending remarks about the partnered Republic of Korea (ROK) leadership to the “deployment status” in the ABCT area of operations. You need to be very careful.”
The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone many changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and CAL assessments, and conversations and observations provided some much-needed information. You know there is not much time before the NTC rotation or when the brigade assumes the RAF mission and there are still many unknowns associated with this new requirement. As you begin to reflect on your upcoming assumption of command you know you need to identify and prioritize the challenges you see within the brigade, identify the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and determine how you will measure success.
[1] REARMM has 3 phases (each 8 months long): Modernize, Train, Mission. Modernize focuses on E-date/MTOE changes (MTOE are seeing significant changes), New Equipment Fielding (NEF), New Equipment Training, Equipment Turn in (Legacy systems) and lateral transfers. Training during this phase focuses on METL tasks and culminates with a CTC. Mission: GFMAP (RAF) DFE
[2] Red Cycle taskings are part of a tiered, localized training cycle where a unit on “red cycle” is tasked to support the Army Garrison’s requirements, unit/organization partnership events, or other non-training events. When in “red cycle” units’ prioritize all these supporting requirements ahead of their MET listed tasks, field exercises, ranges, as generally 80-90 percent of the unit is committed to taskings. When the unit in “red cycle” has no more personnel, any additional taskings are sent to the unit in the “amber” phase of the cycle. This cycle is often referred to as the Red-Amber-Green (RAG) Cycle. A unit on “green cycle” is resourced and focused on individual, crew, and section collective tasks, often culminating with a mobilization or deployment either to a combat training center or theater of operation. They are not available nor required to support the installation or other units’ training events. Units rotate through the phases of the cycle so all have a window to train.